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Abstract 
 
It is an open question whether auditors have credible incentives to exercise professional 
skepticism. We focus on costly skepticism: skepticism that is appropriate and generates 
incremental costs, but does not identify a misstatement. Costly skepticism is typically not 
rewarded by audit supervisors. We theorize and find that rewarding costly skepticism may 
backfire and decrease skepticism on subsequent audit tasks where evidential red flags are 
present. We reason that auditors interpret the reward as a non-credible, better-than-expected 
outcome, leading auditors to view subsequent tasks from a risk-averse gain frame. As a result, 
auditors self-interestedly seek to avoid the risks and effort of exercising additional skepticism. 
This effect decreases auditors’ sensitivity to red flags and auditors’ willingness to inform their 
manager about severe red flags, compromising audit quality. Encouragingly, auditors who have 
experienced a history of rewards for costly skepticism are more motivated to exercise skepticism. 
A survey finds that audit supervisors are likely to reward costly skepticism when their own 
supervisors encourage the behavior and promote consultation within the engagement team. 
Overall, our results suggest firms may benefit from a culture shift emphasizing credible rewards 
for costly skepticism, but that firms currently may not “get what they reward.” 
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1.  Introduction 
Professional skepticism is essential to audit quality, and enhancing auditor skepticism is 
of great concern to regulators, practitioners, and scholars (e.g., Nelson [2009]; PCAOB [2012]; 
IAASB [2015]; KPMG [2016]).
1
 However, little is known about the conditions in which 
individual auditors have sufficient incentives to exercise skepticism, and it may be difficult for 
firms to provide these incentives. Pervasive fee pressures lead to tight budgets, and audit firms 
often absorb the costs of overruns (Dopuch et al. [2003]; Hackenbrack and Hogan [2006]). As a 
result, auditor performance evaluations emphasize meeting time budgets (Agoglia et al. [2015]), 
which may discourage skeptical behavior. Moreover, skepticism that is ex ante appropriate often 
does not identify a misstatement, but does typically generate incremental ex post costs (e.g., 
budget overruns or strained client relations). We use the term “costly skepticism” to describe 
appropriate applications of skepticism that incur costs, yet do not ultimately identify a 
misstatement.
2
 Costly skepticism carries substantial downside risk for individual auditors, as 
supervisors provide disincentives for costly skepticism even when they acknowledge its 
appropriateness (Brazel et al. [2016]). Thus, auditors may not have adequate incentives to 
exercise skepticism. 
An intuitive solution is to implement rewards for costly skepticism, as economic theory 
argues that rewarding a behavior should encourage that behavior (e.g., Prendergast [1999]). 
However, we argue that rewards may not increase skepticism due to two opposing effects. First, 
rewarding costly skepticism may trigger self-interested behavior that decreases skepticism on 
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 Professional skepticism is an attitude that includes a questioning mind and critical assessment of audit evidence, 
and is demonstrated through skeptical actions (e.g., IAASB [2004]; Nelson [2009]; PCAOB [2012]).  
2
 To be clear, skepticism that yields a misstatement is also likely to incur costs. However, Brazel et al. [2016] and 
Brazel et al. [2018] demonstrate that such skepticism is likely to be viewed by superiors as a normal cost of the audit 
that benefits the engagement team. These studies also demonstrate that evaluators reliably reward skepticism that 
identifies a misstatement. In subsequent analyses we illustrate that while reliably rewarding costly skepticism has the 
potential to enhance auditor skepticism, reliable rewards for exercising skepticism that yields a misstatement does 
not.  
2 
 
subsequent tasks. Auditors know that rewards for costly skepticism are uncommon, and thus may 
view rewards as non-credible and unlikely to repeat (Brazel et al. [2016]; Brazel et al. [2018]). 
Instead, a reward is likely a better-than-expected outcome that may cause auditors to view 
subsequent tasks from a risk-averse gain frame (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky [1979]). This leads 
to a self-interested “quit while you’re ahead” mentality, which could prompt auditors to avoid 
the risks of further skeptical behavior – ultimately decreasing skepticism. At the same time, 
auditors may also interpret a reward as a signal that costly skepticism is a desirable behavior, 
which can increase motivation and subsequent skepticism (e.g., Bonner et al. [1997]). Because 
these two causal mechanisms have opposing signs, the adage “you get what you reward” may not 
apply to rewarding skepticism.  
We also examine the severity of red flags or inconsistencies in the evidence available to 
auditors as a potential moderator of the aforementioned effects. Auditors confront increasingly 
complex information with some data points that support client assertions and other data that are 
inconsistent with client assertions. Appropriate responses to inconsistent information are crucial 
to audit quality (Griffith et al. [2015]), and thus appropriate skepticism requires that auditors 
exercise heightened skepticism as the severity of evidential red flags increase (Nelson [2009]). 
We predict that as the severity of red flags increases, the aforementioned skepticism-decreasing 
self-interest effect will decrease, and the skepticism-increasing motivation effect will increase. 
We tested our hypotheses in an experiment with 112 audit seniors. At the onset of the 
experimental case, auditors were informed that this was their first year serving on the 
engagement (i.e., they had no prior year experience with the supervisor) and that they had 
engaged in costly skepticism during interim testing. Half of the auditors were rewarded for this 
work with a positive evaluation, whereas the other half received a middling evaluation and thus 
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were not rewarded. The case then asked the auditors to perform an analytical procedure for sales 
based on a rich information set of financial data and non-financial measures (NFMs). We held 
sales growth constant, and the associated financial data (e.g., industry data) were consistent with 
the level of sales growth. However, NFM growth for the client was negative in all cases, creating 
a red flag. Our primary measure of skepticism was whether or not auditors concluded that the 
sales account warranted additional investigation. We manipulated the trend in NFMs (e.g., 
number of customers) to be increasingly negative, specifically as a minor, moderate, or severe 
red flag (Brazel et al. [2009]). This enabled us to test the appropriateness of auditor skepticism 
(i.e., heightened skepticism as the red flag becomes more severe).  
Our predictions are two opposite-signed indirect effects, with rewards decreasing 
skepticism due to higher auditor self-interest and increasing skepticism due to higher auditor 
motivation. Consistent with auditor self-interest, we find that auditors interpret a reward (vs. no 
reward) for costly skepticism as a better-than-expected outcome and personal benefit, which in 
turn decreases their subsequent skepticism. Contrary to expectations, we do not find a 
skepticism-increasing motivation effect for rewards. Supplemental tests support our theory that 
auditors believe rewards for costly skepticism are infrequent and unlikely to repeat. Auditors 
who were rewarded for costly skepticism did not expect another reward for their work on the 
experimental task, regardless of the skepticism they exhibited.  
Further, we find no evidence that red flag severity moderates either the self-interest or 
motivation effects in our experiment. Instead, auditors rewarded for costly skepticism do not 
increase skepticism towards more severe red flags, thus failing to act skeptically when doing so 
is most appropriat. Additional tests reveal that auditors believe the costs of skepticism would be 
quite high in this condition, possibly explaining their reluctance to act skeptically. Moreover, 
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auditors rewarded for costly skepticism recognize that increasingly severe red flags are 
inconsistent with client assertions (i.e., they exercise appropriate skeptical judgment), but choose 
not to act on their judgment. Being aware of, but not appropriately considering, contradictory 
audit evidence is a behavior consistent with PCAOB inspection findings (PCAOB 2012). These 
auditors are also less willing to communicate the severe red flag to their manager, further 
compromising audit quality by undermining a basic quality control (Nelson et al. [2016]; Lightle 
et al. [2017]). In sum, our evidence suggests that audit firm evaluation cultures may fail to 
provide credible incentives for skepticism. 
Examining the indirect effects of rewards on skepticism allows us to better understand 
the causal mechanisms in the relation between rewards and the application of skepticism, which 
is essential to improving incentives for skepticism. These dysfunctional incentives apply to a 
range of common settings in which auditors work with relatively unfamiliar supervisors (e.g., all 
first year assignments, recurring assignments on which supervisors change due to turnover or 
promotion, experienced supervisor hires, firm human resource needs that assign junior or 
supervising auditors to a new client, industry, or office). Indeed, Christensen and Newton [2017] 
provide archival evidence on engagement team turnover, and illustrate that approximately half of 
the hours charged by team members are charged by members who were not assigned to the 
engagement in the prior year.  
Still, it is possible that supervisors can develop reputations for reliably rewarding costly 
skepticism. Auditors who have experience with such supervisors may interpret a reward for 
costly skepticism as a credible signal, increasing their willingness to exercise skepticism on 
subsequent tasks, as they believe the reward will be repeated. To examine this possibility, we 
measured participants’ personal experiences being rewarded by their supervisors for costly 
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skepticism. Encouragingly, we find that auditors with a history of being rewarded have higher 
motivation to exercise professional skepticism on subsequent tasks. However, this experience 
does not nullify the self-interest effect of rewards that decreases skepticism. Given the 
prevalence of supervisors who do not reward costly skepticism, auditors most likely still consider 
their own best interest and avoid skeptical action if they are unsure about the supervisor. Overall, 
our results highlight the necessity for a culture shift where rewarding costly skepticism is the 
norm, not the exception, so that rewards may begin to have the intended effect. 
Finally, because rewards for costly skepticism can be effective if auditors believe the 
rewards to be credible, we conducted a case-based survey of 127 audit supervisors to explore 
attributes of supervisors who may credibly reward costly skepticism. In the survey, supervisors 
evaluated the performance of a subordinate who engaged in appropriate, yet costly skepticism. 
We find supervisors’ evaluations increase with (1) beliefs that their own superiors would reward 
them for a subordinate’s costly skepticism, and (2) more experience in consultative work 
environments. Note that both involve supportive superiors and positive experiences over time, 
suggesting professional skepticism is a nurtured, learned behavior. This is consistent both with 
our experimental findings that a supportive culture can motivate professional skepticism and 
with regulators’ emphasis on “tone at the top” vis-à-vis professional skepticism (PCAOB 
[2012]). Our results should also inform standard setters’ current deliberations over audit 
supervision and other quality controls to foster appropriate skepticism (PCAOB [2017]; IAASB 
[2017]).
3
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 In addition, the topic of professional skepticism was discussed at the most recent PCOAB Standing Advisory 
Group Meeting (see https://pcaobus.org/News/Events/Pages/SAG-meeting-Nov-2017.aspx), as well as several 
recent IAASB Meetings (see https://www.iaasb.org/system/files/meetings/files/20160314-IAASB-
Agenda_Item_2A-Professional_-Skepticism-Discussion-final_1.pdf). 
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As a whole, our findings suggest that auditor performance evaluation systems prompt 
dysfunctional responses from auditors, creating a vicious cycle in which positive evaluations of 
costly skepticism can discourage skepticism on subsequent tasks. This cycle will likely become 
more crucial to audit quality as data analytics and identifying outliers play a larger role in the 
audit process (KPMG [2017]; EY [2017]). However, our results also point to a solution: a culture 
shift towards reliably rewarding appropriate skepticism, regardless of the outcome. Subordinates 
who regularly experience such rewards are more motivated to engage in skepticism. Further, 
supervisors reward costly skepticism when they experience consultative and supportive 
environments in which they expect to be rewarded for their subordinates’ skepticism. As a result, 
a culture supportive of costly skepticism and consultation may create a virtuous cycle in which 
supervisors encourage skepticism and subordinates exhibit skepticism.  
Although audit firm incentive systems likely function well in many conditions, we argue 
that these systems do not align individual auditor incentives with the broader goal of audit 
quality on the crucially important dimension of professional skepticism. It is critical for audit 
firms to craft quality control systems, mentoring programs, and trainings to promote credible 
rewards for costly skepticism. For example, firms routinely train auditors to engage in 
skepticism, but with cases that involve misstatements. Refining this approach would acclimate 
junior auditors and supervisors to exercising and rewarding costly skepticism. 
2. Theory and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM 
Exercising professional skepticism is fundamental to auditing and increases audit quality 
(e.g., PCAOB [2012]; IAASB [2012]; IAASB [2015]; KPMG [2016]). However, regulators 
consistently note insufficient skepticism on audit engagements and question the degree to which 
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firms’ systems of quality control encourage skepticism (e.g., PCAOB [2012]; IAASB [2015]). A 
firm’s performance evaluation and incentive system is a key quality control component that 
theory suggests should reward employee actions that align with firm interests – namely those 
contributing to efficient and effective audits (e.g., Baiman [1990]; IAASB [2009]). Thus, 
effective evaluation and reward systems should enable firms to address inadequate skepticism. 
Little is known, however, about how such rewards currently affect auditor skepticism.  
In auditing, as in other professions, evaluations are subjectively-assessed composites 
capturing objective outcomes and a variety of hard-to-measure signals relevant to the employee’s 
contribution to the firm (Werner [1994]; Van Scotter et al. [2000]; Witt and Ferris [2003]). The 
primary objective measures on which supervisors evaluate auditors relate to chargeable hours 
and adherence to time budgets (Agoglia et al. [2015]). Supervisors also evaluate subjective 
dimensions, such as the appropriate application of skepticism, client relations, judgment quality, 
technical knowledge, and teamwork. It is particularly difficult for supervisors to evaluate the 
appropriate application of skepticism, because skepticism can conflict with objective indicators. 
For instance, exercising skepticism may be necessary in the presence of red flags, but doing so 
can lead to poor objective performance in the form of budget overruns (Houston [1999]; Nelson 
[2009]; Peecher et al. [2013]).
 
 
Difficulty evaluating skepticism leads to difficulty in providing incentives for skepticism, 
which is further complicated by the low base rate of materially misstated accounts.
4
 Auditors 
often confront a false positive paradox in which cues suggestive of a misstatement (e.g., red 
flags) are more likely to reflect non-misstatements than misstatements (Waller and Zimbelman 
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 Evidence suggests the base rate of materially misstated accounts is quite low. For example, Durney et al. [2014] 
examine 160 sampling applications across 51 audit engagements and find that nearly 60% contain zero misstatement 
and 90% are misstated by 0.5% or less of the recorded balance. Consistent with this notion, 26% of the auditors in 
our experiment reported that they had never detected a material misstatement.  
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[2003]). Nevertheless, auditing standards require auditors to maintain a questioning mindset and 
respond to cues that may signal a misstatement (IAASB [2004]; PCAOB [2015]; [2016]). Thus, 
skepticism is often simultaneously appropriate, yet directed towards fairly-stated accounts. We 
refer to appropriate skeptical behavior that generates costs, but does not yield a misstatement as 
costly skepticism. Because audit supervisors respond negatively to budget overruns, appropriate 
skepticism can lead directly to poor performance on the primary objective measure that 
determines the auditor’s evaluation (e.g., Agoglia et al. [2015]).  
In an effective reward system, supervisors would offset this downside risk for the auditor 
with a positive subjective evaluation for the appropriate application of skepticism. There is 
evidence that supervisors do so in many settings (Gibbs et al. [2004]; Bol and Smith [2011]). 
However, Brazel et al. [2016] provide evidence that audit supervisors discourage costly 
skepticism, even when they acknowledge that the skepticism is appropriate. Moreover, Brazel et 
al. [2016] illustrate that junior auditors know that supervisors will react negatively to costly 
skepticism, which further limits auditors’ willingness to exercise skepticism.  
Performance evaluation theory suggests an intuitive solution to this issue: change 
evaluation systems so that supervisors offset poor objective performance with positive subjective 
evaluations of costly skepticism (e.g., McLeod [2003]; Bol [2008]). Decades of research 
demonstrates that rewarding a behavior is likely to motivate more of that behavior (Prendergast 
[1999]). If auditors trust that supervisors will reward costly skepticism, then the prospect of 
positive evaluations should generate more skepticism. However, because subjective evaluations 
in auditing are often biased and auditors are aware of the bias (Tan and Jamal [2001]; Brazel et 
al. [2016]), positive evaluations may not result in the expected increase in skepticism. In fact, 
rewarding costly skepticism may actually discourage skepticism on subsequent audit tasks.  
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2.2 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 To understand why rewarding costly skepticism may discourage subsequent skepticism 
rather than encourage it, one must consider auditor perceptions of evaluation norms in audit 
firms. Auditors justifiably believe that rewards for costly skepticism are uncommon (Brazel et al. 
[2016]; Brazel et al. [2018]).
5
 All else equal, auditors also likely understand that receiving such a 
reward is a benefit that few of their peers will receive. This is significant because audit firms use 
relative evaluation systems in which small absolute differences in performance between peers 
can lead to large differences in overall rewards (e.g., Holmstrom [1981]; Cichello et al. [2009]).
6
 
Prior literature demonstrates that junior auditors are effective strategists and recognize the 
actions that serve their self-interest (Rich et al. [1997]; Mayhew [2001]; Tan and Jamal [2006]). 
Consistent with these findings, auditors may respond to rewards for costly skepticism in a 
strategic, self-interested manner. 
Specifically, we argue that benefitting from an act of costly skepticism is a better-than-
expected outcome leading auditors to view subsequent tasks from a gain frame (e.g., Kahneman 
and Tversky [1979]). A gain frame likely focuses auditors on avoiding the risks and effort of 
skeptical behavior on their next task, focusing instead on maximizing personal benefits. Building 
on this idea, there is evidence that reward systems exhibit regression towards the mean—that is, 
an evaluation outcome that is far from the norm is likely to be followed by an evaluation 
outcome closer to the norm (Kahneman and Tversky [1973]). In addition, people view evaluation 
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 Altogether, Brazel et al. [2016] and Brazel et al. [2018] observe that costly skepticism is not rewarded even in the 
following contexts: when the skeptical auditor consults and obtains their superior’s approval prior to engaging in 
skeptical actions, when the skeptical auditor evidences his skepticism in the budget file as justification for the 
budget overage, and when the audit committee is likely to insulate the audit team from the costs of skepticism 
(budget overruns and strained management relations). 
6
 Auditors typically work on multiple engagement teams, receiving evaluations from multiple supervisors and often 
receiving multiple evaluations for the same engagement (Capelli and Tavis [2016]; Feintzeig [2017]; Reitman 
[2017]). Audit firms combine the various evaluations for a given auditor into a single, yearly evaluation and then 
rank-order the auditor against others at the same experience level. Firms then use these rankings to sort auditors into 
groups to determine rewards such as raises, bonuses, promotions, client assignments, etc. 
10 
 
outcomes that seem far from the norm with suspicion and respond with lower productivity 
(Berger et al. [2013]). This suggests that auditors are unlikely to believe that a reward for costly 
skepticism will be followed by another reward for costly skepticism. Instead, a reward for costly 
skepticism may instead reinforce that auditors can benefit themselves by avoiding the risks and 
costs of skeptical action. This is consistent with evidence that implementing rewards can 
unintentionally highlight the benefits of self-interested behavior (Cardinaels and Yin [2015]). 
Thus, auditors rewarded for costly skepticism are likely to adopt a “quit while you’re ahead” 
mindset that decreases subsequent skepticism.  
Skeptical behavior risks poor performance on at least one key objective performance 
dimension: going over budget. Given the low probability of either detecting a misstatement or 
receiving another reward for costly skepticism, the cautious route is not to exercise skepticism. 
Doing so offers a high probability of good performance on the objective time budget measure, 
and the low base rate of misstatements means that the likelihood of missing a misstatement is 
relatively low. That is, auditors have more to lose than to gain from skeptical action. Moreover, 
auditors are likely able to rationalize diminished skepticism, as they commonly approach tasks 
expecting no misstatement to exist and are skilled at developing non-misstatement explanations 
for red flags (Kaplan and Reckers [1989]; Kaplan et al. [1992]; Solomon et al. [1999]; Earley 
[2001]).
7
  
Thus, an auditor rewarded for costly skepticism will recognize the reward as a benefit 
that increases their relative ranking, but also interpret the reward as non-credible and unlikely to 
repeat. As a result, the auditor may self-interestedly become less willing to engage in skeptical 
behavior. This leads to our first hypothesis, stated formally:  
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 Auditors prefer to maintain a self-image as a good professional (Kadous et al. [2003]), and the reward helps 
legitimize this self-perception. In general, positive responses to costly behavior often allow people to rationalize not 
engaging in that behavior in the future (Blanken et al. [2015]). 
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H1A:   A supervisor rewarding costly skepticism increases the auditor’s perceived 
personal benefits and, in turn, decreases the auditor’s subsequent skepticism on 
that engagement.  
 
 Of course, auditors may simultaneously interpret a reward as a signal that applying 
skepticism is a valuable component of a high quality audit. Rewards for a behavior tend to 
increase expectations that a behavior will have positive outcomes for the employee (Bonner and 
Sprinkle [2002]). As such, a reward for costly skepticism could increase motivation to engage in 
subsequent skepticism. Similar to the adage “you get what you reward,” we expect auditors who 
receive rewards for costly skepticism to be more motivated to exercise skepticism on subsequent 
audit tasks. This motivation should increase auditor skepticism on subsequent tasks. This leads to 
our second hypothesis, stated formally: 
H1B:   A supervisor rewarding costly skepticism increases the auditor’s motivation to be 
skeptical and, in turn, increases the auditor’s subsequent skepticism on the 
engagement. 
 
2.3 RED FLAG SEVERITY AND THE APPROPRIATENESS OF SKEPTICISM 
  
 Nelson [2009] observes that appropriate skepticism is conditional on the evidence set 
observable to the auditor. Such evidence includes “exceptions” that represent unusual patterns or 
noteworthy deviations indicative of heightened misstatement risk. Skepticism is more 
appropriate when targeted towards more severe red flags, as the appropriate level of skepticism 
is a function of assessed risks (Glover and Prawitt [2014]).  
H1A predicts that auditors will recognize the relative benefits of higher evaluations and 
respond strategically, decreasing skepticism on subsequent audit tasks. We expect that the 
presence of more severe red flags will mitigate this effect. While auditors can stylize workpapers 
to persuade a supervisor that their work was adequate (Rich et al. [1997]; Tan and Yip-Ow 
[2001]), severe red flags are more likely to catch a supervisor’s attention, increasing the potential 
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costs of inadequate skepticism for the subordinate. Not investigating more severe or obvious red 
flags also heightens the engagement team’s exposure to negative inspections findings, litigation 
losses, and other ex-post reviews which are likely to view the evidence set observed by the 
auditor with hindsight bias.
8
 Although auditors become skilled at developing non-misstatement 
explanations as they gain experience and specialized knowledge (Solomon et al. [1999]; Shaub 
and Lawrence [1999]), junior auditors may lack the skill to do so for severe red flags. As a result, 
as the severity of the red flag increases, we expect that even self-interested auditors may not be 
able to “explain away” or ignore the red flag. Thus, we expect the negative effect of rewards for 
costly skepticism to be mitigated as red flags become more severe.  
By contrast, if motivation increases due to a reward (as predicted in H1B), then we 
expect this effect to be amplified by increasingly severe red flags. In general, increased 
motivation should improve performance in subsequent audit tasks, especially those in which 
performance is effort-sensitive (Kennedy [1993]; Libby and Luft [1993]). As a result, to the 
extent that rewards for costly skepticism increase the motivation to engage in skepticism, 
auditors will be better able to identify and differentiate between lower and higher risk items, 
increasing skepticism in the presence of severe red flags. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
H2:      More severe red flags are likely to decrease the personal benefit effect of rewards 
and increase the motivational effect of rewards.  
 
3. Auditor Experiment 
3.1 PARTICIPANTS 
 The participants in our experiment were 112 audit seniors from an international 
accounting firm who completed the experiment during a firm-sponsored training session. Their 
task was a substantive analytical procedure for sales, which is appropriate for audit seniors 
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 http://ww2.cfo.com/auditing/2014/02/pcaobs-audit-quality-highly-suspect. 
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(Trompeter and Wright [2010]; Brazel et al. [2014]). The mean task completion time was 34 
minutes. On average, participants had 34 months of experience and conducted analytical 
procedures related to sales four times during their careers. Two participants did not complete one 
of the measures necessary for our hypothesis tests, thus our final sample was 110 auditors. 
Our experiment was a 2 (Reward: present, absent) X 3 (Red Flag: minor, moderate, 
severe) between-participants design. We randomly assigned participants to one of the six 
experimental conditions. We describe the variables in detail below. 
3.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL CONTEXT  
The experimental materials first informed participants that they were the audit senior 
conducting year-end procedures for the audit of Madison, Inc., a publicly traded manufacturing 
company. This was the participant’s first year serving on the Madison engagement, thus there 
was no prior evaluation history on the engagement or with the audit manager.
9
 Participants then 
read that they had engaged in costly skepticism while conducting interim procedures. 
Specifically, while recalculating depreciation expense for the audit of PP&E, they noted year-to-
year changes in the client’s assumptions for the useful lives of several asset classes. Although the 
client provided supporting internal documentation, participants had deemed it appropriate to 
exercise heightened skepticism and conducted additional procedures to support the changes. 
However, the additional procedures identified no misstatement, caused friction with the client, 
and caused the audit of PP&E to go over budget. The case then provided participants with their 
manager’s evaluation of their performance for this interim testing (see below for the description 
of the REWARD manipulation).  
                                                          
9
 The characteristics of our setting are similar to a range of common settings in which auditors work with relatively 
unfamiliar supervisors (e.g., all first year assignments, recurring assignments on which supervisors change due to 
turnover or promotion, experienced supervisor hires, firm human resource needs that assign junior or supervising 
auditors to a new client, industry, or office). 
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Next, participants completed a substantive analytical procedure related to the sales 
account for one of Madison’s operating units, Madison Sporting Goods, which reported positive 
sales growth. The case informed participants that additional testing of sales would likely go over 
budget and that client management would react negatively to unwarranted additional tests. The 
case provided participants with a rich set of financial and non-financial data to conduct the 
analytic. All financial measure trends were positive and consistent with the client’s sales (e.g., 
industry data, prior year balances, ratios, budgets). The trend for all non-financial measures 
(NFMs), such as the number of customer accounts, patents, and employees, was negative and 
inconsistent with reported sales. We manipulated between-participants the degree to which this 
NFM trend was negative (see below for the description of the RED FLAG manipulation). 
3.3 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
After calculating an expectation for sales and computing the difference between their 
expectation and reported sales, participants provided the study’s primary dependent variable: 
PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM (PS). Specifically, participants chose one of three conclusions 
about whether or not the sales account warranted additional investigation: (1) “The difference is 
IMMATERIAL and the balance appears reasonable,” (2) “The difference is IMMATERIAL, but 
additional work would be required related to this analytical procedure before concluding the 
balance appears reasonable,” or (3) “The difference is MATERIAL and more work is required 
related to this analytical procedure.”10 
We coded PS as “1” if participants concluded that more work would be required to 
conclude the balance was reasonable (i.e., options (2) or (3) above), and “0” if participants 
concluded the balance appeared reasonable and required no additional work (i.e., option (1) 
                                                          
10
 We are thankful for the audit partners who reviewed our experimental instrument for providing us with these three 
outcomes that reflect how differences related to analytical procedures are addressed in practice. 
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above).
11
 Coding responses with additional work as indicative of skepticism is consistent with 
the professional skepticism literature that stresses the importance of evaluating inconsistent 
evidence (e.g., IAASB [2004]; Nelson [2009]). 
3.4 SUPERVISOR EVALUATION REWARDING COSTLY SKEPTICISM (H1A AND H1B) 
In this study, we test dual mediation hypotheses. Hypothesis 1A predicts that a reward for 
costly skepticism (REWARD) increases auditors’ beliefs about their own personal benefit 
(BENEFIT) and, in turn, indirectly decreases PS. Hypothesis 1B predicts that a reward for costly 
skepticism (REWARD) increases auditors’ motivation to engage in skeptical behavior 
(MOTIVATION) and, as such, indirectly increases PS. We manipulated REWARD after 
participants read the description of their costly skepticism related to PP&E testing at interim (i.e., 
before participants performed the year-end analytical procedure described above). Participants 
were randomly assigned to an interim evaluation of either “Met Expectations” (NO REWARD) or 
“Exceeded Expectations” (REWARD) from their supervisor.12  
Consistent with Brazel et al. (2016), we measured our first mediator BENEFIT with the 
question “How would you rank in your class (compared to other seniors in your office) if you 
consistently received the above evaluation?” Participants responded on a scale ranging from 1 
(Bottom of My Class) to 10 (Top of My Class). We measured our second mediator 
MOTIVATION with the question “To what extent were you motivated to exercise professional 
skepticism when auditing the 12/31/12 Madison sporting goods sales account?” Participants 
responded on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at all Motivated) to 10 (Extremely Motivated).  
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 We dichotomized this variable because both options (2) and (3) involve further investigation (i.e., skeptical 
action) and because only nine participants chose option (3). Our inferences are the same if we use a dependent 
variable with three levels instead of two. 
12
 The experimental materials made it clear that the REWARD/NO REWARD interim evaluation was for costly PS 
and there was no other performance-related information presented. See Brazel et al. (2016) for a discussion of how 
auditors do not consider an evaluation of “Met Expectations” as a reward.  
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3.5 APPROPRIATENESS OF SKEPTICISM (H2) – SEVERTIY OF RED FLAGS 
To examine the appropriateness of PS, we manipulated the severity of the NFM RED 
FLAG (RF) in the case. Sales growth was constant at 9% in all conditions, and all conditions 
included NFMs with negative growth, inconsistent with reported sales. We manipulated the 
NFM trend to create three levels of RF: MINOR, MODERATE, and SEVERE. NFM growth for 
the MINOR, MODERATE, and SEVERE conditions was -1%, -21%, and -41%, respectively.
 
See 
the Appendix for a description of all variables used in this study. 
3.6 PRIMARY RESULTS 
3.6.1. Manipulation Checks  
For REWARD, a post-experimental question asked participants whether they received a 
“Met Expectations” or “Exceeded Expectations” evaluation for their interim work, and 95 of the 
110 participants (86%) answered correctly.
13
 As a manipulation check for RF, we asked 
participants to assess the trend in NFMs from 1 (Very Negative) to 10 (Very Positive). 
Consistent with an effective manipulation, RF significantly affects NFM trend assessments (F2, 
103 = 17.05; p < 0.01), and the assessments decrease monotonically from the minor to moderate to 
severe conditions. 
3.6.2. Univariate Statistics  
Table 1, Panel A reports univariate values of BENEFIT, MOTIVATION, and PS across 
REWARD conditions. Panel B reports PS values broken out across RF conditions. We do not 
observe a univariate difference in PS across REWARD conditions, which is logical given that we 
predict opposite-signed indirect effects that could cancel each other out. Also, auditors in the NO 
REWARD condition appropriately adjusted their PS based on available evidence, whereas 
auditors in the REWARD condition did not (illustrated in Table 1, Panel B and Figure 1). 
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 Inferences are identical if we exclude auditors who answered the manipulation check incorrectly. 
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Specifically, PS in the NO REWARD condition was higher for the severe, as opposed to minor 
RF (0.70 versus 0.35, p < 0.05). By contrast, PS was approximately the same in the REWARD 
conditions, regardless of RF severity. As such, greater sensitivity to RF in the NO REWARD 
condition yields similar univariate means across REWARD conditions. We discuss this finding 
further when reporting tests for H2 examining the appropriateness of skepticism. 
3.6.3. Tests of Hypotheses 1A and 1B – Skeptical Behavior  
Table 2, Panel A reports the results of our tests of H1A and H1B. H1A predicts that a 
reward for costly skepticism increases auditors’ perceived personal benefits and, in turn, 
decreases auditors’ skepticism on a subsequent task. H1B predicts that a reward for costly 
skepticism increases auditors’ motivation to engage in skepticism and, as such, increases 
auditors’ subsequent skepticism. In tandem, H1A and H1B predict that REWARD has two 
opposite-signed indirect effects. To test these hypotheses, we use the following regressions: 
BENEFIT = δ1 + β1REWARD+ ε       (1) 
MOTIVATION = δ2 + β2REWARD+ ε      (2) 
PS (1 or 0) = δ3 + β3REWARD + β4BENEFIT + β5MOTIVATION + ε  (3) 
 
We use the Preacher and Hayes (2008) bootstrapping approach to test the indirect effects 
predicted by H1A and H1B. We use 5,000 bootstrap re-samples with replacement to estimate 
90% confidence intervals for each indirect effect, with significance indicated by intervals that do 
not include zero. The indirect effect predicted by H1A is the product β1REWARD*β4BENEFIT. 
We expect this product to be negative. The indirect effect predicted by H1B is the product of 
β2REWARD*β5MOTIVATION. We expect this product to be positive.
14
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 Our hypothesis test inferences are identical using 95% confidence intervals. However, 90% confidence intervals 
are often ex ante appropriate when using a dichotomous dependent variable that inherently inflates type 2 error 
(Demidenko [2007]). Also, note that equations (1) and (2) are OLS regressions and equation (3) is a logistic 
regression. The Preacher and Hayes [2008] procedure uses standardized coefficients to compute confidence intervals 
because the indirect effects involve multiplying coefficients from OLS with coefficients from logit. 
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As shown in Table 2 and Figure 2, the results support H1A. Auditors believe that a 
REWARD for costly skepticism increases their BENEFIT (p < 0.01) (column i), and the effect of 
BENEFIT on PS is significantly negative (p < 0.05) (column iii). In addition, the product of 
β1REWARD*β4BENEFIT is negative and significant (Lower CI = -2.08, Upper CI = -0.44). 
Auditors believe that a reward for costly skepticism provides a positional advantage over peers 
and are thus less willing to engage in subsequent skeptical actions. However, the results do not 
support H1B, as auditors do not assess their MOTIVATION as higher in response to a REWARD 
(p > 0.10) as seen in Table 2 (column ii).
15
 Figure 2 reports that the product of β1 REWARD*β5 
MOTIVATION is insignificant (Lower CI = -0.09, Upper CI = 0.25).
16
   
3.6.4. Estimating the Negative Effects of Rewards for Costly Skepticism  
Note in Table 2 that REWARD has a marginally positive coefficient on PS after 
controlling for the mediators (column iii), which indicates a positive direct effect of REWARD on 
PS (Preacher and Hayes [2008]). The positive direct effect of REWARD indicates that rewards 
for costly skepticism have the potential to increase the application of skepticism, if one could 
remove the negative BENEFIT effect. On this note, to quantify the indirect effects on PS, Pearl 
([2005]; [2010]) suggests a procedure to estimate “what could have been” if the negative effect 
of a mediator had not occurred.
 
That is, it involves estimating what PS would have been in the 
REWARD condition using the mediator values from the NO REWARD condition. Untabulated 
results related to this procedure suggest PS would be 0.75 in the REWARD condition if the 
negative effect of BENEFIT would not occur, versus the 0.47 we observe in Table 1, Panel A. 
This difference of 0.28 is referred to as the “natural indirect effect.” Thus, the natural indirect 
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 Although the effect of MOTIVATION on PS is, as one would expect, significantly positive (p < 0.05) (column iii), 
it is not via an indirect effect of REWARD. 
16
 In equation (3), variance inflation factors for BENEFIT, MOTIVATION, and REWARD are less than or equal to 
2.4. We re-perform individual regressions with only BENEFIT and MOTIVATION as predictors of PS and find that 
the inferences do not change, thus multicollinearity does not affect our findings.  
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effect of REWARD via BENEFIT in our study is a decrease in PS of approximately 0.28 in the 
REWARD condition. This illustrates that rewards could increase skepticism, if auditors’ 
dysfunctional reactions to these evaluations could be undone.  
3.6.5. Auditors’ Beliefs about Rewards for Costly Skepticism  
Our theory implicitly assumes that auditors may believe performance evaluations regress 
towards the mean (i.e., those receiving a reward (as opposed to no reward) may be less likely to 
expect their next evaluation outcome to be positive). The data supports our theory that auditors 
interpret the reward as a non-credible, better-than-expected outcome that is unlikely to be 
repeated. To test this possibility, we first measure (1) auditors’ self-evaluations of their 
performance for the task, and (2) auditors’ predictions of how the manager would evaluate their 
performance. We measure each on 11-point Likert scales anchored by -5 = “Not meeting 
Expectations,” 0 = “Meeting Expectations,” and +5 = “Exceeding Expectations.” If self-
evaluations are higher than predicted manager evaluations, then auditors expect a worse outcome 
than they deserve (i.e., a negative outcome).  
Consistent with our assumption, receiving a reward for costly skepticism causes auditors 
to expect a negative evaluation for the subsequent task. Self-evaluations are significantly higher 
than predicted manager evaluations in the REWARD condition (p < 0.01, untabulated). By 
contrast, self-evaluations are lower than predicted manager evaluations in the NO REWARD 
condition (p = 0.07, untabulated), indicating expectations of a more positive outcome. In brief, 
receiving a reward on one task caused auditors to expect a negative outcome on the next task, 
while not receiving a reward caused auditors to expect a positive outcome on the next task.  
3.6.6. Tests of Hypothesis 2 – Appropriateness of Skeptical Behavior  
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As shown in Panel A of Figure 3, H2 predicts that the indirect effects of REWARD via 
BENEFIT and MOTIVATION on PS will be conditional on RF severity. That is, H2 predicts 
“moderated mediation” in which the mediating effects are conditional on the evidence set 
available to the auditor. We test this hypothesis by estimating the indirect effects predicted by 
H1A and H1B (as described in the previous section) at each level of RF severity.
17
 As shown in 
Panel B of Table 2, neither hypothesized indirect effect is conditional on RF severity in the 
manner that we predict. Specifically, the dysfunctional self-interest effect through BENEFIT is 
strongest when RF is severe (the only interval in Panel B that does not include zero), which is 
opposite of our prediction. This significantly negative effect reflects the fact that the greatest PS 
difference between the NO REWARD and REWARD conditions is in the severe RF condition 
(0.70 versus 0.44 as depicted in Table 1, Panel B and Figure 1). Thus, the BENEFIT effect 
constrains skepticism most clearly in the severe RF condition, which is very alarming for audit 
quality. Moreover, the indirect effect through MOTIVATION is insignificant at all levels of RF. 
Thus, H2 is not supported.  
 A plausible explanation for this finding is that auditors believe skeptical action would be 
more costly in the severe RF condition than in other conditions (e.g., a larger inconsistency 
requires more testing). To test this possibility, we measured auditors’ beliefs that additional 
procedures would cause a budget overrun on a 10-point Likert scale. Auditors assessed a higher 
likelihood that additional procedures would go over budget in the severe RF condition than in the 
moderate or minor RF conditions (p = 0.02, untabulated). This supports our logic that auditors in 
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 We use this approach for simplicity of presentation. An alternative test is to re-estimate equation 3 with an 
interaction term between RF and each of the mediators (i.e., PS (1 or 0) = δ4 + β6REWARD + β4MOTIVATION + 
β7BENEFIT + β8MOTIVATION*RF + β9BENEFIT*RF + β10RF). The predicted moderated mediation is determined 
by observing a significantly negative coefficient on the BENEFIT*RF interaction term and/or a significantly positive 
coefficient on the MOTIVATION*RF interaction term. We observe neither, and our inferences are identical using 
either approach.   
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the REWARD condition are strongly averse to risking poor objective performance (e.g., budget 
overruns), because auditors in the NO REWARD condition act skeptically in the severe RF 
condition even though they recognize the costs. 
3.7 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
3.7.1. Recognition of the Red Flag and Informing the Audit Manager  
While PS measures our participants’ skeptical actions, we separately examine their 
skeptical judgments, which should influence PS (Nelson 2009). We find that auditor hesitation to 
act on the severe RF in the REWARD condition is not driven by insufficiently skeptical 
judgments. Recall that auditors in both REWARD conditions passed the manipulation check for 
RF, thus auditors noticed the negative NFM trend. Further, we measured RECOGNITION of the 
red flag as the degree of perceived inconsistency between reported sales and NFMs on a 10-point 
Likert scale with endpoints of 1 (Very Small) and 10 (Very Large). Table 3 reports the cell 
means of RECOGNITION. 
Auditors in both the REWARD and NO REWARD conditions appear to have made 
appropriate skeptical judgments. That is, RECOGNITION increases from minor to severe RF. 
Nevertheless, when linking these judgments to action, we again observe that REWARD plays a 
dysfunctional role. As Nelson (2009) would suggest, RECOGNITION is positively correlated 
with PS, but only in the NO REWARD condition (ρ = +0.37). We see no such link between 
judgment and action in the REWARD condition (ρ = - 0.06). Being aware of, but not 
appropriately considering, contradictory audit evidence is a behavior consistent with PCAOB 
inspection findings (PCAOB 2012). 
Finally, we find that inappropriate responses could threaten audit quality by constraining 
auditors’ willingness to communicate red flags to their manager. Before auditors made their PS 
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choice, they documented any issues that they would discuss with their manager. We coded a 
variable INFORM MANAGER that equals “1” if the auditor noted that they would discuss the 
NFM trend with their manager and “0” otherwise. Table 3 and Figure 1 report and illustrate cell 
means, respectively. In short, in the NO REWARD condition we find that INFORM MANAGER 
increases as the RF moves from minor to severe (0.31 versus 0.79, p < 0.01). We do not observe 
such a positive relation when REWARD is present (0.44 versus 0.53, p = 0.62).
18
 The 
dysfunctional response to rewards of costly skepticism also decreases communication of red 
flags up the audit team hierarchy, further compromising audit quality (Lightle et al. 2017).   
3.7.2. Auditors’ Personal History of Being Rewarded for Costly Skepticism 
To this point, our findings have been discouraging. Avoiding skeptical actions likely 
reflects the belief that costly skepticism will not be rewarded, but natural differences in this 
belief can develop through experience. Auditors work on multiple engagements for a variety of 
supervisors in any given year, and supervisors vary in their evaluation biases and preferences 
(e.g., Tan and Jamal 2001). Auditors with a history of being rewarded for costly skepticism 
likely have stronger beliefs that costly skepticism will be rewarded, and thus may be more 
willing to engage in skepticism. That is, such a history may increase MOTIVATION for 
skepticism and constrain the BENEFIT effect.  
Therefore, we test whether a history of being rewarded for costly skepticism moderates 
the indirect effects observed in H1A and H1B. We post-experimentally measured the variable 
REWARD HISTORY asking the auditors whether or not their managers would reward them for 
exercising professional skepticism when “You are over budget, the relationship with 
management is strained, and your skeptical behavior DID NOT identify a misstatement.” 
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 An untabulated mediation analysis confirms that the REWARD to BENEFIT to PS indirect effect (H1A) also 
decreases INFORM MANANGER. 
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Participants responded on a 10-point Likert scale with endpoints ranging from 1 (Would Not 
Reward Skepticism) to 10 (Would Definitely Reward Skepticism). To ease interpretation and the 
estimation of cell means, we create a dichotomous variable partitioning our sample on REWARD 
HISTORY in the top third versus bottom two thirds.
19
  
 As depicted in Figure 3, Panel B, we test whether REWARD HISTORY moderates the 
relations between REWARD and our two mediators BENEFIT and MOTIVATION. In simple 
terms, we are interested in whether the negative self-interest effect through BENEFIT decreases, 
and/or the positive effect through MOTIVATION increases, if we consider natural differences in 
REWARD HISTORY. 
We estimate the following equations: 
BENEFIT = δ + β6REWARD+ β7REWARD HISTORY+ β8 REWARD*REWARD 
HISTORY + ε      (4) 
MOTIVATION = δ + β9REWARD+ β10REWARD HISTORY + β11REWARD*REWARD 
HISTORY + ε   (5) 
PS (1 or 0) = δ + β12REWARD + β13MOTIVATION + β14BENEFIT + ε       (6) 
 
 We provide descriptive statistics partitioned by REWARD HISTORY and REWARD in 
Table 4, Panel A. As shown in Panel B column (i), REWARD HISTORY does not moderate the 
indirect effect of REWARD on PS via BENEFIT. That is, there is no effect of REWARD 
HISTORY or the REWARD*REWARD HISTORY interaction.
20
 
The findings for motivational effects are encouraging. As shown in Panel B of Table 4, in 
column (ii) REWARD HISTORY is significantly positively associated with MOTIVATION (p < 
0.01). There is also a marginally significant REWARD*REWARD HISTORY interaction term (p < 
0.10). The interaction is consistent with the descriptive means in Table 4 Panel A. Specifically, 
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 Our inferences do not change if we use the continuous measure, but estimating cell means and interpreting 
marginal effects is more straightforward when using a dichotomous measure.  
20
 Although a history of being rewarded for costly skepticism by a supervisor may prompt an auditor to exercise 
skepticism on that supervisor’s engagement, such experience may not do so with other supervisors since auditors 
have strong priors that, in general, rewarding costly skepticism is relatively uncommon. 
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in the NO REWARD condition, auditors who have a positive REWARD HISTORY have 
significantly higher MOTIVATION (8.53 vs. 6.83). By contrast, when REWARD is present, 
MOTIVATION is relatively high regardless of REWARD HISTORY. This is consistent with 
REWARD HISTORY helping auditors maintain the motivation to be skeptical, despite not being 
rewarded for costly skepticism on an earlier task.  
 These results further highlight the benefits of a shift in evaluation culture that reliably 
rewards costly, yet appropriate skepticism. Auditors whose supervisors provide credible rewards 
for costly skepticism are motivated to be skeptical, even when they receive a negative one-off 
evaluation of costly skepticism. In an untabulated analysis, we include REWARD HISTORY in a 
regression predicting PS and find that it is positively associated with PS, controlling for our other 
predictors.
21
 Notably, we also measure auditors’ history of rewards for general skepticism 
(where the outcome of the skepticism was not noted in the measure) and find no relation with PS 
in our experimental task. This suggests higher skepticism may not stem from a history of general 
rewards for skepticism, but rather from the experience of being rewarded specifically for costly 
skepticism. If a positive REWARD HISTORY with costly skepticism is important for encouraging 
skepticism, then a natural question emerges: what leads a supervisor to reliably reward costly 
skepticism? We address this question in our follow-up survey. 
4. Auditor Survey – Who Rewards Costly Skepticism? 
 In our experiment, we find that auditors who have more experience being rewarded for 
costly skepticism are more motivated to engage in skepticism, even when they do not receive a 
reward in the experiment. Thus, we conduct a case-based survey to explore the attributes of audit 
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 In untabulated analyses, we also measure and control for other determinants suggested by Nelson (2009) including 
trait skepticism (Hurtt 2010) and various dimensions of knowledge such as industry experience, experience with 
analytical procedures, and experience with NFMs. Our inferences do not change when controlling for these 
variables. 
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supervisors (e.g., traits, experiences) who are likely to reliably reward costly skepticism. We use 
a case-based survey due to the potential for social desirability bias in a standard survey (i.e., 
supervisors may not respond honestly to a standard survey question asking whether or not they 
reward costly skepticism). Further, because traits and experiences are relatively stable attributes 
across situations (Kassin [2003]), evidence that a participant rewards costly skepticism in our 
study is a valid signal that the participant would do so in other settings. Identifying the factors 
that are associated with supervisors who provide positive evaluations of costly skepticism can 
provide insights into how these types of supervisors can be recruited and/or developed.   
4.1 PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURES 
Participants in our survey were 127 practicing auditors from two Big Four and two non-
Big Four firms. We collected responses from two of the firms at firm-sponsored training sessions 
and from the other two firms via an online survey hosted by Qualtrics. There are no significant 
effects for firm or data collection medium. Participants’ mean auditing experience was 6.3 years, 
with 95% indicating experience evaluating the performance of subordinates.  
All participants received the exact same case-based content in their research materials. 
The materials are adapted from Brazel et al. [2016] and asked auditors to evaluate the 
performance of a staff member under their supervision at a hypothetical audit client in the 
manufacturing industry. The materials then described the staff member’s performance on a 
substantive analytical procedure related to a division’s sales. Similar to our auditor experiment, 
the staff auditor noted a red flag between trends in reported sales and trends in non-financial 
measures (NFMs), whereas financial measures were consistent with sales.  
Participants were informed that the staff auditor incorporated NFMs into the analytical 
procedure for the current year, noted an inconsistency between sales growth and related NFMs, 
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and chose to investigate the red flag. The identification and investigation of the red flag caused 
the staff auditor to go over budget and strain relations with management. The staff auditor 
ultimately determined that the inconsistency was the result of the division outsourcing some 
operations overseas. Additional testing related to the overseas operations led to a conclusion that 
there was no misstatement in the sales account. Participants were then asked to evaluate the staff 
auditor, who had engaged in appropriate, yet costly skepticism.
22
 
4.2 MEASURES  
The primary dependent measure is participants’ evaluation of the staff member (EVAL). 
We measure EVAL with the question “Based on the information presented on the prior pages, 
how would you evaluate [the staff auditor’s] overall performance?” Participants responded on an 
11-point Likert scale with endpoints ranging from -5 (Below Expectations) to +5 (Above 
Expectations). We follow the Nelson [2009] model to identify and categorize measures that 
could influence skeptical behavior/the evaluation of skepticism, which we group into incentives, 
traits, and knowledge.
23
 The Appendix provides details on the measurement of these variables. 
For incentives, we measure beliefs about how the staff member’s actions will affect the 
evaluator’s own performance evaluation by their audit partner with AFFECT OWN EVAL. We 
also measured GENERAL PS REWARDS, how participants’ own managers in the past had 
rewarded general skepticism. Finally, similar to our experiment, we measured REWARD 
HISTORY for costly skepticism. For traits, we measured the TRAIT SKEPTICISM of participants 
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 Our survey participants’ mean rating for the appropriateness of the subordinate’s skepticism was 1.05 on a scale 
ranging from -5 (Was NOT SUFFICIENTLY skeptical) to 0 (Was APPROPRIATELY Skeptical) to +5 (was 
OVERY skeptical). 
23
 Nelson (2009) also includes “evidential input” as a determinant, but our research materials hold constant the 
evidential input related to the analytical procedure.  
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using the Hurtt [2010] scale. We also measured participants’ beliefs about their own general 
abilities by measuring MY RANK relative to others at the same experience level.
24
  
Nelson [2009] describes how relevant knowledge is developed through experiences and 
training. Accordingly, we measured multiple dimensions of experience and training that could 
influence knowledge related to our setting. We measured general audit EXPERIENCE, NFM 
experience, and manufacturing INDUSTRY experience. We also measured participants’ FRAUD 
TRAINING and their perceptions of the misstatement base rate (MM BASERATE), as perceptions 
of base rates likely influence skepticism (e.g., Bonner et al. [1997]). Finally, evaluators’ own 
experiences with consultative and supportive supervisors can affect how they evaluate 
skepticism (Glover and Prawitt [2014]; Nelson et al. [2016]). We therefore include the measure 
CONSULTATIVE to capture the extent to which participants consulted with their own 
supervisors while exercising skepticism. 
4.3 RESULTS 
 Table 5 presents the results of multivariate analyses in which we run separate OLS 
regressions for each group of determinants, as specified in Nelson [2009], as well as a full model 
of determinants on EVAL. In column (i), we find AFFECT OWN EVAL is positively associated 
with rewarding costly skepticism. Thus, our evidence highlights the importance of “tone at the 
top,” as audit partners who endorse costly skepticism on their engagements are likely to develop 
supervisors who reward their staff for the behavior. In contrast to our experimental results for 
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 Although this measure has some similarity with the BENEFIT measure used in the experiment as they both 
evaluate perceptions of ranking, this measure differs on two important dimensions: (1) it captures participants’ 
perceptions of their overall general ability rather than their ability in regards to performance in a single evaluation 
setting, and (2) it is not conditioned on anything in the research materials. 
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subordinates, we do not find an effect of evaluators’ own experiences being rewarded for costly 
skepticism (i.e., no effect for REWARD HISTORY).
25
 
In column (ii), note that we find no effect for TRAIT SKEPTICISM. However, auditors 
who have higher general ability tend to reward costly skepticism, as evidenced by the significant 
and positive coefficient for MY RANK. If auditors ranked higher in their class are more 
influential at their firms, then it is possible that they could be effective in sharing/training “best 
practices” such as reliably rewarding costly skepticism.26 
 In column (iii), we find CONSULTATIVE has a positive and significant sign, consistent 
with the idea that more positive evaluations of costly skepticism stem from auditors who 
experience more supportive and open environments in which auditors feel comfortable raising 
issues. Finally, we find two knowledge effects in which total EXPERIENCE and NFM are 
positively associated with evaluations of costly skepticism.  
In sum, our survey findings are consistent with the intuition of our experimental findings. 
Beliefs that superiors will reward or support costly skepticism are associated with (1) increased 
motivation for skepticism among subordinates and (2) more positive evaluations of costly 
skepticism by supervisors. Similarly, among evaluators, experiencing more consultative 
supervisors is associated with higher evaluations of skepticism. Just as subordinates were more 
willing to act skeptically when they had credible incentives for costly skepticism, evaluators 
appear more willing to reward costly skepticism when they have experienced audit teams that 
valued a questioning mind/consultation within the team. Overall, there appears to be a reciprocal, 
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 Reasoning ex post, this difference may be attributable to the survey asking how their audit partner would react to 
costly skepticism and the experiment asking how their audit manager would react to costly skepticism. Agoglia et 
al. (2015) find that managers are more sensitive to budget overages than partners are, thus the incentive intensity 
captured by this particular measure may be greater in the experiment than in the survey.   
26
 This finding also raises the encouraging possibility that when auditors have relatively stable beliefs about their 
high ranking, they may be more willing to promote skepticism. By contrast, the experimental finding that higher 
rankings lead to lower skepticism would still apply when auditors believe their higher ranking directly results from 
an unexpected benefit. 
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“pay it forward” mentality cultivated by strong mentoring environments that reliably reward 
costly skepticism.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 We examine auditors’ incentives to exercise professional skepticism. We begin with the 
widely-held premise that there is insufficient skepticism in practice and recent evidence that 
auditor incentive systems do not adequately reward costly skepticism (appropriate skeptical 
behavior that generates costs, but identifies no misstatement). In our experiment, auditors 
rewarded for costly skepticism interpret a positive evaluation as a benefit that they wish to 
preserve and, in turn, are not apt to exercise skepticism in a subsequent task. On the positive 
side, those who have experienced consistent rewards for costly skepticism are more motivated to 
exercise skepticism, even after they receive a negative evaluation for costly skepticism. A 
supplemental survey finds that supervisors are most likely to reward costly skepticism when they 
have experienced consultative supervisors who are themselves supportive of costly skepticism. 
Consequently, audit firms are likely to benefit from developing cultures in which appropriate 
skepticism is encouraged, regardless of outcome. 
 However, our findings also suggest that in order to increase skepticism in the field, 
incentives for exercising skeptical must be credible for the individual auditor. Our results 
indicate that the current state of performance evaluation systems in audit firms may create 
dysfunctional incentives in which audit subordinates may not increase skepticism even when 
prior skepticism has been rewarded. The idea that auditors are strategic is consistent with the 
review process literature showing that auditors strategically manage impressions with their 
reviewers (e.g., Rich et al. [1997]). It is also consistent with the stream of research on the 
unintended effects of bias in auditor supervision and review (e.g., Tan and Jamal [2001]; Wilks 
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[2002]; Peecher et al. [2010]). While reviewers have developed mechanisms to cope with 
strategic behavior (e.g., Tan and Trotman [2003]), there is not an immediately obvious response 
to the dysfunctional effect we observe. Given evidence that audit supervisors have poor insights 
into subordinates’ capabilities (Kennedy and Peecher [1997]; Messier et al. [2008]; Peecher et al. 
[2010]), it is unlikely that supervisors have good insight into subordinates’ motivations either. 
Further, we find that rewards for costly skepticism decrease the likelihood that auditors would 
communicate issues to their supervisors, which limits supervisors’ abilities to respond. Future 
research could examine the conditions under which audit supervisors anticipate this strategic, 
non-skeptical behavior by their subordinates and, if they do, the mechanisms they employ to 
cope with such behavior.  
In addition, when skeptical behavior yields a misstatement the outcome is documented in 
the audit adjustment file. When skepticism does not detect a misstatement, it is uncertain whether 
and how this exercise of skepticism is visible to others. Better documentation of costly 
skepticism could reduce the negative effects we observe. Future research can examine ways in 
which costly skepticism can be documented (e.g., in the budget file) such that acts of costly 
skepticism can be effectively conveyed in audit the documentation.  
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APPENDIX – VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
Variable Description 
EXPERIMENT 
REWARD Manipulated between participants as an interim evaluation of “Met Expectations” (No Reward) or 
“Exceeded Expectations” (Reward). 
RED FLAG (RF) Manipulated at three levels between participants as MINOR, MODERATE, and SEVERE. In all 
conditions, sales growth was constant at positive 9%. In the MINOR condition, NFM growth was -
1%. In the MODERATE and SEVERE conditions, NFM growth was -21% and -41%, respectively. 
BENEFIT 
 
Self-assessments of how participants would rank in their class (compared to other seniors in their 
office) from receiving the evaluation in REWARD, collected on a scale ranging from 1 (Bottom of 
My Class) to 10 (Top of My Class). 
MOTIVATION  Self-assessments of how motivated participants were to exercise professional skepticism during the 
task. Participants responded on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at All Motivated) to 10 (Extremely 
Motivated). 
PROFESSIONAL 
SKEPTICISM (PS) 
Coded as “1” if participants concluded that more work would be required in the task and “0” if 
participants concluded the balance appeared reasonable. 
INFORM MANAGER 
 
Coded as “1” if participants explicitly wrote down the NFM trend in the list of items they would 
communicate to their manager and “0” otherwise. 
RECOGNITION Assessments of the extent to which the NFM trend is inconsistent with the growth in recorded sales, 
collected on a scale ranging from 1 (Very Small) to 10 (Very Large). 
REWARD HISTORY Self-assessment of likelihood that managers in the participant’s own personal experience would 
reward costly skepticism, collected on a scale ranging from 1 (Would Not Reward Skepticism) to 10 
(Would Definitely Reward Skepticism). For analyses, we partition into HIGH (top third) and LOW 
(bottom two thirds). 
GENERAL 
SKEPTICISM 
Self-assessment of likelihood that managers in participants’ own personal experience would reward 
skepticism, collected on a scale ranging from 1 (Would not reward skepticism) to 10 (Would 
definitely reward skepticism).  
SURVEY 
EVAL Assessments of the staff member’s performance, collected on a scale ranging from -5 (Below 
Expectations) to 0 (Met Expectations to +5 (Above Expectations).  
AFFECT OWN EVAL Assessment of how the partner will evaluate the participant’s own performance collected on a scale 
ranging from -5 (Below Expectations) to 0 (Met Expectations to +5 (Above Expectations). 
GENERAL PS 
REWARDS 
Self-reported experience being rewarded by managers for any skepticism, collected on a scale 
ranging from 1 (Would Not Reward Skepticism) to 10 (Would Definitely Reward Skepticism). 
REWARD HISTORY Self-assessment of likelihood that managers in the participant’s own personal experience would 
reward costly skepticism, collected on a scale ranging from 1 (Would Not Reward Skepticism) to 10 
(Would Definitely Reward Skepticism). For analyses, we partition into HIGH (top third) and LOW 
(bottom two thirds). 
TRAIT SKEPTICISM Trait skepticism measured via the Hurtt (2010) scale.  
MY RANK 
 
Self-assessments of how participants currently rank in their class, collected on a scale ranging from 
1 (Bottom of My Class) to 10 (Top of My Class). 
CONSULTATIVE Self-reported extent to which participants consult their supervisors while exercising skepticism, 
collected on a scale ranging from 0 (Never) to 10 (Always). 
TOTAL 
EXPERIENCE 
Total self-reported audit experience in years & months (converted to decimals). 
INDUSTRY The participant’s percentage of chargeable hours in manufacturing during the past three years (the 
industry in our case). 
NFM Percentage of substantive analytical procedures conducted by the participant that have involved 
NFMs. 
FRAUD TRAINING The participant’s number of hours of training on financial statement fraud. 
MM BASERATE The participant’s estimate of the percentage of pre-audit financial statements that contain a material 
misstatement. 
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FIGURE 1 – EXPERIMENT: CELL MEANS FOR SKEPTICISM & INFORM MANAGER 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the cell means for PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM (PS) and INFORM MANAGER for each RED 
FLAG condition in each of the two REWARD conditions. PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM (PS) is coded as “1” if 
participants concluded that more work would be required in the task and “0” if participants concluded the balance 
appeared reasonable. INFORM MANAGER is coded as “1” if participants explicitly wrote down the NFM trend in 
the list of items they would communicate to their manager and “0” otherwise. RED FLAG was manipulated at three 
levels between participants as MINOR, MODERATE, and SEVERE. In all conditions, sales growth was constant at 
positive 9%. In the MINOR condition, NFM growth was -1%. In the MODERATE and SEVERE conditions, NFM 
growth was -21% and -41%, respectively. REWARD is manipulated between participants as an interim evaluation of 
“Met Expectations” (No Reward) or “Exceeded Expectations” (Reward). 
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FIGURE 2 – INDIRECT EFFECTS HYPOTHESIS TESTS 
 
 
Figure 2 depicts the coefficients of the indirect effect of REWARD on PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM (PS) via 
MOTIVATION and BENEFIT. REWARD is manipulated between participants as an interim evaluation of “Met 
Expectations” (No Reward) or “Exceeded Expectations” (Reward). BENEFIT is a self-assessment of how 
participants would rank in their class (compared to other seniors in their office) from receiving the evaluation in 
REWARD, collected on a scale ranging from 1 (Bottom of My Class) to 10 (Top of My Class). MOTIVATION is a 
self-assessment of how motivated participants were to exercise professional skepticism during the task. Participants 
responded on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at All Motivated) to 10 (Extremely Motivated). PROFESSIONAL 
SKEPTICISM (PS) is coded as “1” if participants concluded that more work would be required in the task and “0” if 
participants concluded the balance appeared reasonable.  
 
The coefficients are standardized to allow for computation of the indirect effects and are estimated using: 
 
BENEFIT = δ1 + β1REWARD+ ε      (1) 
MOTIVATION = δ2 + β2REWARD+ ε     (2) 
PS (1 or 0) = δ3 + β3REWARD + β4BENEFIT + β5MOTIVATION + ε  (3) 
 
Significance of coefficients is indicated with *** for p < 0.01, ** for p < 0.05, and * for p < 0.10. 
 
The indirect effects of REWARD on PS are the products of β1REWARD*β4BENEFIT for the BENEFIT mediator and 
β2REWARD*β5MOTIVATION for the MOTIVATION mediator. Confidence intervals are bias-corrected intervals for 
the estimate of the indirect effect, which are estimated using 5,000 bootstrapped re-samples of the data with 
replacement. Significance of the indirect effect is indicated if the intervals do not include zero.  
 
  is from the path c’ and is the direct effect of REWARD on PS controlling for the effects of MOTIVATION and 
BENEFIT.  
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FIGURE 3 – EXPERIMENT: CONCEPTUAL MODELS OF CONDITIONAL INDIRECT 
EFFECTS 
 
Panel A: Moderating Effect of Red Flags in the Audit Evidence (H2) 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Moderating Effect of Auditors’ Personal Histories of Rewards for Costly Skepticism 
 
 
Figure 3 Panel A illustrates how the effects of both BENEFIT and MOTIVATION on PROFESSIONAL 
SKEPTICISM (PS) are predicted in H2 to be moderated by RED FLAG. REWARD is manipulated between 
participants as an interim evaluation of “Met Expectations” (No Reward) or “Exceeded Expectations” (Reward). 
BENEFIT is a self-assessment of how participants would rank in their class (compared to other seniors in their 
office) from receiving the evaluation in REWARD, collected on a scale ranging from 1 (Bottom of My Class) to 10 
(Top of My Class). MOTIVATION is a self-assessment of how motivated participants were to exercise professional 
skepticism during the task. Participants responded on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at All Motivated) to 10 (Extremely 
Motivated). PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM (PS) is coded as “1” if participants concluded that more work would be 
required in the task and “0” if participants concluded the balance appeared reasonable. RED FLAG was manipulated 
at three levels between participants as MINOR, MODERATE, and SEVERE. In all conditions, sales growth was 
constant at positive 9%. In the MINOR condition, NFM growth was -1%. In the MODERATE and SEVERE 
conditions, NFM growth was -21% and -41%, respectively. Figure 3 Panel B depicts how the effects of REWARD 
on both BENEFIT and MOTIVATION are expected to be moderated by REWARD HISTORY. REWARD HISTORY is 
a self-assessment of the likelihood that managers in the participant’s own personal experience would reward costly 
skepticism, collected on a scale ranging from 1 (Would Not Reward Skepticism) to 10 (Would Definitely Reward 
Skepticism). For analyses, we partition into HIGH (top third) and LOW (bottom two thirds). 
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TABLE 1 – EXPERIMENT: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Panel A – Descriptive Statistics by REWARD for BENEFIT, MOTIVATION, & PS 
 MEDIATORS OUTCOME MEASURE 
 BENEFIT MOTIVATION PS 
NO REWARD 4.90 
(1.59) 
n = 53 
 
7.43 
(2.01) 
n = 53 
0.53 
(0.50) 
n =53 
REWARD 
 
8.65 
(1.63) 
n = 57 
7.56 
(2.12) 
n = 57 
0.47 
(0.50) 
n = 57 
 
MEAN 
 
6.84 
(2.47) 
n = 110 
 
7.50 
(2.06) 
n = 110 
 
0.50 
(0.50) 
n = 110 
 
Panel B – Cell Means by REWARD & RED FLAG for PS 
  
RED FLAG 
 
 MINOR MODERATE SEVERE MEAN 
NO REWARD 0.35 0.50 0.70 0.53 
 n = 17 n = 16 n = 20 n = 53 
     
REWARD 0.45 0.53 0.44 0.47 
 n = 20  
 
n = 19 n = 18 n = 57 
 
MEAN 0.41 
n = 37 
0.51 
n = 35 
0.58 
n = 38 
0.50 
n = 110 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. Panels A & B present descriptive statistics for BENEFIT, MOTIVATION, and 
PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM (PS) across the experimental conditions of REWARD and RED FLAG. REWARD is 
manipulated between participants as an interim evaluation of “Met Expectations” (No Reward) or “Exceeded 
Expectations” (Reward). BENEFIT is a self-assessment of how participants would rank in their class (compared to 
other seniors in their office) from receiving the evaluation in REWARD, collected on a scale ranging from 1 (Bottom 
of My Class) to 10 (Top of My Class). MOTIVATION is a self-assessment of how motivated participants were to 
exercise professional skepticism during the task. Participants responded on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at All 
Motivated) to 10 (Extremely Motivated). PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM (PS) is coded as “1” if participants 
concluded that more work would be required in the task and “0” if participants concluded the balance appeared 
reasonable. RED FLAG was manipulated at three levels between participants as MINOR, MODERATE, and 
SEVERE. In all conditions, sales growth was constant at positive 9%. In the MINOR condition, NFM growth was -
1%. In the MODERATE and SEVERE conditions, NFM growth was -21% and -41%, respectively.  
 TABLE 2 – EXPERIMENT 
Panel A: Hypotheses 1A & 1B – Direct and Indirect Effects of Rewards for Costly Skepticism 
 MEDIATORS OUTCOME  
 BENEFIT 
(i) 
MOTIVATION 
(ii) 
PS 
(iii) 
CONSTANT 4.99 
(21.94) 
*** 7.43 
(26.14) 
*** 0.26 
(0.29) 
 
REWARD 3.66 
(11.58) 
*** 0.13 
(0.32) 
 1.08 
(1.69) 
* 
BENEFIT     -0.34 
(-2.52) 
** 
MOTIVATION     0.20 
(1.85) 
** 
N 110  110  110 
    Confidence Intervals 
Indirect Effect REWARD  BENEFIT  PS (-2.08, -0.44) 
Indirect Effect REWARD  MOTIVATION  PS (-0.09, 0.25) 
 
Panel B: Hypothesis 2 – Moderating Effect of Red Flag Severity 
 RED FLAG 
MEDIATOR MINOR RED 
FLAG 
MODERATE RED 
FLAG 
SEVERE RED 
FLAG 
BENEFIT (-2.39, 2.16) (-3.23, 0.23) (-4.62, -0.53) 
MOTIVATION (-0.91, 0.09) (-0.20, 0.72) (-1.05, 0.62) 
 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
 
Panel A of Table 2 presents standardized coefficients from results of regressions for our tests of H1A and H1B. 
REWARD is manipulated between participants as an interim evaluation of “Met Expectations” (No Reward) or 
“Exceeded Expectations” (Reward). BENEFIT is a self-assessment of how participants would rank in their class 
(compared to other seniors in their office) from receiving the evaluation in REWARD, collected on a scale ranging 
from 1 (Bottom of My Class) to 10 (Top of My Class). MOTIVATION is a self-assessment of how motivated 
participants were to exercise professional skepticism during the task. Participants responded on a scale ranging from 
1 (Not at All Motivated) to 10 (Extremely Motivated). PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM (PS) is coded as “1” if 
participants concluded that more work would be required in the task and “0” if participants concluded the balance 
appeared reasonable. The dependent measure is indicated in the column heading. BENEFIT and MOTIVATION are 
continuous measures, thus the coefficients are standardized OLS coefficients and test statistics are t-scores. 
PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM (PS) is a dichotomous measure, thus the coefficients are standardized logit 
coefficients and test statistics are Z-scores. Confidence intervals are 90% bias-corrected confidence intervals, and 
significance of the indirect effect is indicated by confidence intervals that do not include zero. 
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TABLE 2 – EXPERIMENT (continued) 
 
Panel B of Table 2 presents confidence intervals for the indirect effects of BENEFIT and MOTIVATION on PS at 
each level of the RED FLAG (RF) manipulation. RED FLAG was manipulated at three levels between participants as 
MINOR, MODERATE, and SEVERE. In all conditions, sales growth was constant at positive 9%. In the MINOR 
condition, NFM growth was -1%. In the MODERATE and SEVERE conditions, NFM growth was -21% and -41%, 
respectively. Support for H2 would be indicated by (1) decreasing significance of the BENEFIT indirect effect as the 
RF becomes more severe and/or (2) increasing significance of the MOTIVATION indirect effect as the RF becomes 
more severe. Neither condition is supported. 
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TABLE 3 – EXPERIMENT: RED FLAG RECOGNITION & COMMUNICATION TO 
MANAGER 
 
Cell Means for RECOGNITION and INFORM MANAGER 
 RED FLAG RECOGNITION INFORM MANAGER 
 MINOR 4.44 0.31 
NO REWARD MODERATE 6.53 0.36 
 SEVERE 7.90 0.79 
    
 MINOR 5.75 0.44 
REWARD MODERATE 7.74 0.50 
 SEVERE 7.22 0.53 
 
Table 3 depicts the cell means for RECOGNITION and INFORM MANAGER across the experimental conditions of 
REWARD and RED FLAG. RECOGNITION  is the participant’s assessment of the extent to which the NFM trend is 
inconsistent with the growth in recorded sales, collected on a scale ranging from 1 (Very Small) to 10 (Very Large). 
INFORM MANAGER is coded as “1” if participants explicitly wrote down the NFM trend in the list of items they 
would communicate to their manager and “0” otherwise. RED FLAG was manipulated at three levels between 
participants as MINOR, MODERATE, and SEVERE. In all conditions, sales growth was constant at positive 9%. In 
the MINOR condition, NFM growth was -1%. In the MODERATE and SEVERE conditions, NFM growth was -
21% and -41%, respectively. REWARD is manipulated between participants as an interim evaluation of “Met 
Expectations” (No Reward) or “Exceeded Expectations” (Reward). 
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TABLE 4 – EXPERIMENT: AUDITORS’ PERSONAL EXPERIENCE WITH REWARDS 
FOR COSTLY SKEPTICISM 
Panel A:  Cell Means 
 REWARD 
HISTORY 
   
  BENEFIT MOTIVATION PS 
NO REWARD  NEGATIVE 4.90 6.83 0.49 
 POSITIVE 5.18 8.53 0.59 
     
REWARD NEGATIVE 8.54 7.46 0.43 
 POSITIVE 8.85 7.75 0.55 
 
Panel B: Regression for Conditional Indirect Effect  
 BENEFIT MOTIVATION PS 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
CONSTANT 4.90 
(17.32) 
*** 6.83 
(20.15) 
*** 0.21 
(0.23) 
 
REWARD 3.64 
(9.23) 
*** 0.63 
(1.33) 
 1.05 
(1.64) 
 
REWARD HISTORY 0.28 
(0.56) 
 1.70 
(2.86) 
**   
REWARD*REWARD 
HISTORY 
0.03 
(0.05) 
 -1.41 
(-1.73) 
*   
MOTIVATION     0.22 
(1.98) 
** 
BENEFIT     -0.35 
(-2.56) 
** 
N 105  105  105  
 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.  Panel A of Table 4 depicts descriptive statistics for the BENEFIT, 
MOTIVATION, and PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM (PS) across levels of the REWARD and REWARD HISTORY 
variables. BENEFIT is a self-assessment of how participants would rank in their class (compared to other seniors in 
their office) from receiving the evaluation in REWARD, collected on a scale ranging from 1 (Bottom of My Class) to 
10 (Top of My Class). MOTIVATION is a self-assessment of how motivated participants were to exercise 
professional skepticism during the task. Participants responded on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at All Motivated) to 
10 (Extremely Motivated). PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM (PS) is coded as “1” if participants concluded that more 
work would be required in the task and “0” if participants concluded the balance appeared reasonable. REWARD is 
manipulated between participants as an interim evaluation of “Met Expectations” (No Reward) or “Exceeded 
Expectations” (Reward). REWARD HISTORY is a self-assessment of the likelihood that managers in the 
participant’s own personal experience would reward costly skepticism, collected on a scale ranging from 1 (Would 
Not Reward Skepticism) to 10 (Would Definitely Reward Skepticism). For analyses, we partition into HIGH (top 
third) and LOW (bottom two thirds). 
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TABLE 4 – EXPERIMENT: AUDITORS’ PERSONAL EXPERIENCE WITH REWARDS 
FOR COSTLY SKEPTICISM (continued) 
 
Panel B of Table 4 presents standardized coefficients from results of regressions for our supplemental analyses. The 
dependent measure is indicated in the column heading. BENEFIT and MOTIVATION are continuous measures, thus 
the coefficients are OLS coefficients and test statistics are t-scores. PS is a dichotomous measure, thus the 
coefficients are logit coefficients and test statistics are Z-scores.   
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TABLE 5 – SURVEY:  DETERMINANTS OF REWARDS FOR COSTLY SKEPTICISM 
 
  EVAL 
(i) 
 EVAL 
(ii) 
 EVAL 
(iii) 
 EVAL 
(iv) 
 
Incentives AFFECT OWN EVAL 0.37 ***     0.36 *** 
 GENERAL PS REWARDS  0.02      -0.16  
 REWARD HISTORY  0.04      0.04  
Traits TRAIT SKEPTICISM   < 0.01    0.07  
 MY RANK   0.19 **   0.08  
Knowledge CONSULTATIVE     0.21 ** 0.26 ** 
TOTAL EXPERIENCE     0.19 * 0.20 ** 
INDUSTRY      -0.11  -0.15  
NFM      0.17 * 0.17 * 
 FRAUD TRAINING     -0.06  -0.05  
 MM BASERATE     -0.10  -0.08  
 R-squared 0.14  0.04  0.09  0.23  
 N 127  127  127  127  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
 
Table 5 depicts coefficients from OLS regressions.  The dependent measure is EVAL, which is the participant’s 
assessment of the junior auditor’s performance, collected on a scale ranging from -5 (Below Expectations) to 0 (Met 
Expectations to +5 (Above Expectations). AFFECT OWN EVAL is an assessment of how the partner will evaluate 
the participant’s own performance collected on a scale ranging from -5 (Below Expectations) to 0 (Met Expectations 
to +5 (Above Expectations). GENERAL PS REWARDS is the self-reported experience being rewarded by managers 
for any skepticism, collected on a scale ranging from 1 (Would Not Reward Skepticism) to 10 (Would Definitely 
Reward Skepticism). REWARD HISTORY is a self-assessment of the likelihood that managers in the participant’s 
own personal experience would reward costly skepticism, collected on a scale ranging from 1 (Would Not Reward 
Skepticism) to 10 (Would Definitely Reward Skepticism).  For analyses, we partition into HIGH (top third) and 
LOW (bottom two thirds). TRAIT SKEPTICISM is measured via the Hurtt (2010) scale. MY RANK is a self-
assessment of how the participant currently rank in their class, collected on a scale ranging from 1 (Bottom of My 
Class) to 10 (Top of My Class). CONSULTATIVE is the extent to which participants consult their supervisors while 
exercising skepticism, collected on a scale ranging from 0 (Never) to 10 (Always). TOTAL EXPERIENCE is the 
participant’s audit experience in years & months (converted to decimals). INDUSTRY is the participant’s percentage 
of chargeable hours in manufacturing during the past three years (the industry in our case). NFM is the percentage of 
substantive analytical procedures conducted by the participant that have involved NFMs. FRAUD TRAINING is the 
participant’s number of hours of training on financial statement fraud. MM BASERATE is the participant’s estimate 
of the percentage of pre-audit financial statements that contain a material misstatement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
